Impact of Stock Recommendations on Finnish Stock Market by Luomala, Iiro
UNIVERSITY OF VAASA 
 
THE SCHOOL OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE 
 
 
 
Iiro Luomala 
 
Impact of Stock Recommendations on Finnish Stock Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
  
 
 
Master Thesis 
    Finance 
 
 
 
VAASA 2019 
  
  
1 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS            page 
 
ABSTRACT 7 
1. INTRODUCTION 9 
1.1. Purpose of the study  10 
1.2. Hypothesis 11 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 12 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 13 
2.1. Efficient Markets 13 
2.2. Anomalies 15 
2.3. Behavioural Biases 16 
2.3. Limits to Arbitrage 17 
3. VALUATION MODELS 18 
3.1. Capital Asset Pricing Model 18 
3.2. The Arbitrage pricing theory 22 
3.3. The Fama-French (FF) Five-Factor Model 23 
3.4. Dividend Discount Model 25 
3.5. The Constant-Growth Model 26 
3.6. Free cash flow 26 
3.7. Discounted cash flow (DCF) 27 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
4. ANALYSTS ROLE IN THE STOCK MARKET 29 
4.1. Who are the analysts? 29 
4.2. Factors that are affecting price-reaction 31 
4.2.1. Dartboard research 33 
 
4.3. Strategies that based on recommendations                 35 
5. DATA & METHODOLOGY 37 
5.1 Data 37 
5.2 Methods of the OLS regression 38 
5.3. Methods of panel data models 41 
6. EMPIRICAL PART 44 
6.1 Portfolios 44 
6.2. Results of the OLS regression analysis 49 
6.3. Results of panel data models 53 
7. CONCLUSION 60 
REFERENCES 64 
 
  
 
 
4 
 
 
 
  
 
 
5 
 
 
TABLE OF FIGURES AND TABLES   page 
 
Figure 1. Development of OMXH PI-index   10 
 
Figure 2. Three forms of the Efficient market hypothesis  13 
 
Figure 3. The security market line    20 
 
Figure 4. The Efficient Frontier of Risky Assets with the Optimal CAL  21 
 
Figure 5. The Efficient Frontier and the Capital Market Line  21 
 
Figure 6. Annual returns of portfolios and OMX-index  47 
 
 
 
Table 1. Number of the recommendations   45 
 
Table 2. Annual returns of portfolios and market return  46 
 
Table 3. Portfolios return reduced by market return   48 
 
Table 4. Portfolio’s measurements     49 
 
Table 5. The results of the Ordinary Least Squares   50 
 
Table 6. Overall statistics of portfolios    54 
 
Table 7. The results of the Hausman specification test  55 
 
Table 8. The results of the panel data analysis   58 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
6 
 
 
  
 
 
7 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF VAASA 
School of Accounting and Finance 
Author:   Iiro Luomala 
Topic of the thesis:  Impact of stock recommendations on Finnish 
   Stock Market 
Degree:  Master of Science in Economics and Business 
 Administration 
Master’s Programme:  Finance 
Supervisor:   Timo Rothovius 
Year of entering the University: 2014 
Year of completing the thesis: 2019   Number of pages: 70 
 
 
ABSTRACT: 
 
Stock recommendations have gain interest, and became more important over the past years. 
Thus, brokerage houses are spending more and more money to examine companies and then, 
investors are following those recommendations. Hence, the purpose of the thesis is to exam-
ine whether stock recommendations may generate positive abnormal returns. Earnings gen-
erated by stock analysts’ recommendations can be considered to be an anomaly, that is, a 
deviation from the efficient market hypothesis. According to Fama’s (1970) efficient market 
hypothesis, all information should be available and new information should reflect to prices 
immediately when the new announcement is given.  
 
Stock recommendations can be divided into five groups based on stock analysts’ recommen-
dations; strong buy, buy, hold, sell and strong sell recommendations. Based on analysts’ con-
sensus recommendations, five portfolios are formed, whose performance is under investiga-
tion. When a company is given a recommendation, it is added to a specific portfolio and the 
company’s return is calculated. When the consensus recommendation changes, the company 
will be moved to another portfolio and the return will be recalculated. The thesis studies stock 
prices and returns of 62 companies from the Finnish stock market between 2010 and 2018. 
 
The hypothesis of the thesis is tested by several statistical methods, such as an ordinary least 
square and panel data methods. The results of both statistical methods are corresponding, 
thus strong buy, buy and unexpectedly, also strong sell recommendations, generate positive 
abnormal returns while sell recommendations produce negative abnormal returns during the 
observation period. Neither panel data methods nor OLS regression could find any statisti-
cally significant results for hold recommendations. 
 
 
 
KEY WORDS: Stock recommendation, abnormal returns, analyst  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The stock recommendations of research analysts are interesting to investors, companies and 
academic researchers because brokerage houses are using millions of dollars to investigate 
companies and their analysts’ statements and opinions are published in magazines, newspa-
pers and on television as well. However, Lin & McNichols’ (1998) results show that the 
impact or strength of recommendation depends on the independence of analysts, as all ana-
lysts are not independent and external factors can influence on the recommendations. It is 
important to investigate the impact of recommendations thus market participants such as 
traders, companies, banks and institutions are investing money on the stock markets based 
on those recommendations which may not have completely independent. 
According to Fama’s (1970) the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), stocks should consist 
of all the information that is available and this should reflect rapidly to the stock prices. Based 
on this assumption, the stock analyst should not be able to produce any information that 
would change stock prices to one way or another. In that case, there should not be a possibility 
to achieve abnormal returns by following the stock analyst’s recommendations. 
During the observation period, there has been ups and downs. For example, in 2011, the stock 
market faced the financial crisis, and because of that stock prices decreased strongly. Since 
2012, prices have been increased almost without any exceptions and that can be seen from 
Figure 1 that represents OMXH Price Index’s development. OMXH PI-index will be used as 
a benchmark index in this thesis. 
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Figure 1. Development of OMXH PI-index 
 
1.1. Purpose of the study  
The motivation of this study is to examine whether there are any profitable ways of using 
stock recommendations to achieve positive abnormal returns. That will be tested by ordinary 
least square regression analysis and additionally, the statistical significance is also investi-
gated by panel data methods, which provide some robustness check whether the effect of 
recommendations have any impact on stock returns. There is also used a modified panel data 
model which take into account lagged returns and it allows to examine whether the returns 
are auto correlated or is the effect due to a recommendation. 
This thesis includes a daily stock recommendation, prices and returns from the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange from January 2010 to the end of October 2018. There are 62 companies whose 
recommendations have been taking into account and based on these recommendations, port-
folios are formed. Then, the returns of each portfolio are calculated and then their statistical 
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significance is tested by different methods. Companies are in the specific portfolio that time 
while the specific consensus recommendation is on, and then, when the consensus recom-
mendation changes, the company will be moved to another portfolio and returns will be re-
calculated. 
It is interesting to see whether the recommendations have any impact on stock prices and is 
there any possibility to achieve positive abnormal returns by following recommendations in 
Finnish stock market and break the assumptions of the efficient market hypothesis. If there 
is not any significant evidence of stock recommendation’s impact on stock returns, then in-
vestors may consider whether there is any sense to follow and invest based on those stock 
recommendations. Stickel (1995) find an evidence that sell and buy recommendations have 
a stronger impact on stock returns comparing to hold recommendations in the U.S stock mar-
ket. Also, Stickel’s (1995) results show that the effect of the recommendation is depended 
on a few different factors such as a reputation of analyst and size of brokerage-house. Based 
on those findings, there may be presented an assumption that also some statistically signifi-
cant effects would be found in Finnish stock market. 
 
1.2. Hypothesis 
This study consists of one hypothesis that is shown below. The hypothesis supposes that there 
is no possibility to achieve positive abnormal returns by following stock recommendations 
by analysts. The hypothesis will be tested by several statistical methods and if there can find 
any statistically significant result of abnormal returns, then the null hypothesis must be re-
jected.  
 
H0: Portfolios based on recommendations cannot generate positive abnormal returns 
H1: Portfolios based on recommendations can generate positive abnormal returns 
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1.3. Structure of the thesis 
The structure of this thesis is the following: after introduction, there will be the theoretical 
part that contains the efficient market theory, the anomalies and the behavioural biases. This 
part gives a robust scientific basis for the thesis. The third chapter concentrates on different 
valuation models and it offers a solid background to the theory of the valuation modelling. 
There will be introduced models such as the CAPM, the Free Cash Flow, the Dividend Dis-
count Model, the Gordon’s model and the Arbitrage Pricing Theory.  
The fourth chapter introduces the analyst’s role in stock markets and there will be explained 
how analysts behave in the stock markets and what is their purpose to give recommendations. 
There will be introduced earlier research results of stock recommendations’ impact on the 
stock market. Also some strategies that based on stock recommendations will be presented. 
The fifth chapter represents data and methodology part in which there will be presented all 
the relevant data and the methods of how the thesis has been done. There will be shown the 
methods to examine abnormal returns and also the methods of different panel data models. 
In the sixth chapter, there is the empirical part in which contains results of the performance 
of the portfolios, the results of ordinary least square and panel regressions. In the end, there 
will be the seventh chapter that covers the conclusion of the thesis. 
 
  
 
 
13 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Efficient Markets 
The efficient market hypothesis has been the central propositions since 1970 when Eugene 
Fama represents that the EMH consider how information reflect the security prices. Theoret-
ically, neither fundamental nor technical analysis can produce excess returns. The efficient 
market hypothesis can be dived into three factors that are weak-form tests, semi-strong-form 
tests and strong-form tests. First, weak-form tests, in which the prices are affected by histor-
ical information. Second, semi-strong-form tests, in which publicly available information 
may have an impact on the prices. Then, strong-form tests, in which all the information are 
already in the prices including inside information. (Shleifer 2000.) All the mentioned forms 
are described below in Figure 2. The figure shows that strong-form contains both, semi-
strong-form and weak-form, thus semi-strong-form count in weak-form and then weak-form 
describes only past information. 
 
 
 
Strong-form 
Semi-strong form 
Weak-form 
Figure 2. Three forms of the Efficient market hypothesis 
 
 
14 
 
 
According to Fama (1970), the EMH can be summarized as follows; the markets are con-
cerned about whether the prices are “fully reflect” available information at any point in time. 
While investors are acting rationally, they value the security for its fundamental value; the 
net present value of its future cash flows, discounted by the risk factors. When investors learn 
something about those securities’ fundamental values, they respond fast to the new infor-
mation by bidding them down if the news is bad and bidding up if the news is good. Because 
of that, security prices include all the information that is available almost immediately and 
the prices rectify to new levels that are equivalent with the new net present values of cash 
flows. (Shleifer 2000.) 
Shleifer (2000) adds that the EMH does not die or live by investors’ rationality because in 
many scenarios markets are still predicted to be efficient, even some investors are not acting 
rationally. It is said that the irrational investors are trading randomly in the market. When 
there is a lot that kind of traders, and when their trading strategies are uncorrelated, their 
trades are likely to cancel each other out. In that case, there will be significant trading volume 
as the irrational investors are trading securities with each other, but the prices are not close 
to their fundamental values. The EMH can be made even in the situations where the trading 
strategies are correlated.  
An important effect of efficient market theory is that stock prices should follow a random 
walk. The term random walk represents the future movements of the variable that cannot be 
predicted because the variable is just as likely to rise as to fall. (Mishkin 1994.) According 
to Malkiel (2015), changes in stock prices are unpredictable and they are following a random 
walk. In the markets, there are a lot of players whose are selling their services but in the case 
of the EMH, investment forecasts and advisory services are worthless because of people are 
spreading information that affects the prices and all the secrets are already out to everyone. 
Randomly developing stock prices might be the necessary outcome of intelligent investors 
competing to observe relevant information on which to sell or buy a stock before the other 
of the market becomes aware that information (Bodie et al. 2014: 350). 
According to Fama’s (1998) research, in an efficient market, underreaction is as important 
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as overreaction is. In earlier studies, such as in the EMH, is said that the prices overreact to 
information. Markets are consistently market efficient while anomalies are divided randomly 
between overreaction and underreaction. Fama proposes that an even split between underre-
action and overreaction is a good description of the existing anomalies. Even though, the 
most long-term return anomalies might be disappearing because of the changes in analysing 
techniques. Patell & Wolfson (1984) represent that most of the stock prices response to cor-
porate earnings or dividends notifications appear within 10 minutes of the notifications. 
 
2.2. Anomalies 
Technical analysis has a narrower range of information to create portfolio than does funda-
mental analysis. Investigations of the efficiency of fundamental analysis ask if publicly avail-
able information beyond the trading history of an asset can be used to enhance investment 
performance. Findings show that it is difficult to recognize the efficient market hypothesis 
and therefore it is often referred to as efficient market anomalies. An anomaly describes an 
event where actual earnings differ from expected results that based on models. (Bodie et al. 
2014: 366.) 
There are several good examples of anomalies. Rolf Banz (1981) represents that firm size 
has an impact on a portfolio’s returns. Average annual returns are systematically higher on 
the small-firm portfolios. It is good to remember that smaller-firm portfolios bear more risk 
than higher ones. On the other hand, when returns are adjusted for risk by the CAPM, there 
is a coherent premium still for the smaller-sized portfolios. A few years later, researchers 
(Blume & Stambaugh 1983; Keim 1983; Reinganum 1983) proved that the small-size effect 
is the strongest in the first two weeks of January. The effect is called a January effect. 
The P/E-ratio anomaly stands that stocks with extraordinarily low P/E-ratios earn larger risk-
adjusted returns than stocks with high P/E-ratio. It is said that this anomaly based on mis-
specification of the CAPM. The P/E-ratio is said to be a proxy for some miss out factor hence 
that factor would include in the model, it would remove the anomaly. (Basu 1977; De Bondt 
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& Thaler 1985.) 
Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) were the first researchers who proved that it is possible to create 
statistically significant abnormal returns using the Momentum-strategy. The research based 
on Rober Levy’s (1967) relative strength theory in which investors buy stocks that are in-
creasing and sell stocks that are decreasing. 
According to the EMH, new information should affect stock prices rapidly, for example, the 
stock prices should jump immediately after good news. But there is also an anomaly and it is 
called the Post-Earnings-Announcement Price Drift. (Bodie et al. 2014: 369.) Ball and 
Brown (1968) published an article in which after the company’s announcement the cumula-
tive abnormal returns continue to increase (decrease) after good (bad) news. In that case, 
stock prices do not respond to new information immediately. 
 
2.3. Behavioural Biases 
Many research summarizes that investors are not able to do fully rational decisions even the 
information processes were perfect. These behavioural biases mostly affect how people are 
framing questions of return versus risk, and in that case, make risk-return trade-offs. Inves-
tors’ decisions seem to be affected by how choices are framed. For example, an individual 
investor may refuse a bet when it is caused in terms of the risk surrounding possible gains 
but may accept the same bet if described in terms of the risk surrounding potential losses. 
(Bodie et al. 2014: 391.) 
One well recognized behavioural bias is overconfidence. Investors tend to overestimate their 
skills, abilities or knowledge. It has been noticed that people rank themselves better than 
other human beings, it is called as a better-than-average effect. Overconfidence may lead 
investors to make poor investment decisions on stock markets. (Bodie et al. 2014: 390.) 
Coval & Shumway (2005) research concludes that trader’s loss aversion has an impact on 
prices and a trader who lost money in the morning is 15% more likely to make such a trade 
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also in the afternoon than an investor who earned money in the morning. There are significant 
results of price changes done by loss-averse traders thus a trader that has lost money in the 
morning takes additional risk 27% more than if he gained profit in the morning. They con-
cluded that there is more afternoon risk following morning losses than following morning 
profits. 
Another behavioural bias is the Regret Avoidance. Psychologists have found that people 
whose decisions turn out badly, blame themselves more when that decision was more uncon-
ventional. For example, buying Apples’ stocks that turn down is not as painful as having the 
same losses on an unknown start-up company. This decision is easier to attach to bad luck 
rather than bad decision making and bring less regret as well. (Bodie et al. 2014: 392.) 
 
2.3. Limits to Arbitrage 
The theory of limited arbitrage based on the behaviour of rational investors, called arbitra-
geurs, thus economics is better at understanding and modelling that kind of behaviour. Be-
havioural biases would not matter for stock pricing if arbitrageurs would fully use the mis-
takes of investors. Behavioural supporters argue that there are a few factors that limit the 
ability to create profit from mispricing. (Shleifer 2000; Bodie et al. 2011: 414.)  
According to Sheleifer & Vishny (1997) the model suggests where anomalies are probably 
to occur in financial markets, and why arbitrage fails to eliminate them. They show that per-
formance-based arbitrage cannot fully be effective in bringing asset prices to fundamental 
values. Professional arbitrageurs may evade highly volatile arbitrage positions because of the 
risk of losses even though average return may be attractive. The idea of the efficient markets 
based on the supposition that most investors see and then take the available arbitrage possi-
bilities such as the small firm anomaly. In fact, arbitrage resources are strongly concentrated 
only on a few investors who are specialized in that. After all, there are a relatively small 
number of investors understand the return anomaly well enough to exploit it.  
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3. VALUATION MODELS 
 
3.1. Capital Asset Pricing Model 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is one of the most common known pricing models 
for securities and it is considered as a centrepiece of modern financial economics. The CAPM 
was published by three researchers, William Sharpe (1964), John Litner (1965) and Jan Mos-
sin (1966). Those articles were a continuation of Harry Markowitz modern portfolio theory 
that was published in 1952. (Bodie, Kane, Marcus 2011: 308-345) 
The CAPM provides a benchmark rate of return for estimating possible investments. It also 
offers an opportunity to make an educated suppose to the expected return on securities that 
have not been traded in the marketplace. The formula of CAPM is written as below (Bodie, 
Kane, Marcus 2014: 291-323.): 
 
(1) E(Ri) = Rf + i E(Rm)  Rf  
 
where E(Ri) = Expected return of portfolio i 
 Rf = Risk - free rate 
 i = Beta of the security 
 E(Rm) = Expected return of markets 
 
While using the capital asset pricing model, there have to use some simplifying assumptions. 
These assumptions ignore many real-world complexities but on the other hand, it gives us 
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some robust insights into the nature of equilibrium in security markets. (Bodie et al. 2011: 
308-345) 
 
1. There are many investors with small income comparing to the total in-
come of all investors. There is the perfect competition assumption, thus 
investors are price-takers whose trades do not have an impact on the 
prices. 
2. All investors have the same time horizon and holding period. 
3. Investments are only publicly traded financial assets, such as bonds and 
stocks. Investors can lend or borrow at a fixed risk-free rate. 
4. There are no taxes or transaction costs. 
5. All investors are rational mean-variance optimizers. 
6. All investors analyse assets in the same way and they have similar ex-
pectations as well. 
 
The expected return-beta relationship can be described graphically, as the security market 
line (SML) in Figure 3, which is as well a visual representation of the capital asset pricing 
model, where the y-axis of the chart represents expected return and x-axis of the chart repre-
sents beta (market risk). When the risk and expected return are in relation to each other, then 
fairly priced securities lie on the SML. All assets have to lie on the SML in the market equi-
librium. (Bodie et al. 2014: 291-323.) 
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The CAPM suppose that all investors are optimizing their portfolios according to Markowitz 
(1952) portfolio theory. All individual investors should use an input list to draw an efficient 
borderline using all available risky assets and recognize an efficient risky portfolio, P, by 
drawing the line CAL (capital allocation line) to the borderline, as in Figure 4. As a conse-
quence, all the investors hold assets with weights appeared by the Markowitz optimization 
process. Because the market portfolio is the aggregation of all the identical risky portfolios, 
it also will have the same weights. In this case, if all investors choose the same portfolio with 
the same weights, it has to be a market portfolio. Therefore, the CAL based on individual 
investor’s optimal risky portfolio and in fact also, it will be the capital market line CML) that 
is represented in Figure 5. This suggestion let us say much about the risk-return ade-off. 
(Bodie et al. 2014: 291-323.) 
SML 
𝛽𝑀 = 1.0 
E(r
m
) 
E(r) 
Figure 3. The security market line (Bodie et al. 2014: 298.) 
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CAL (P) 
Efficient 
Frontier 
P 
ℴ𝑝 
E(r
p
) 
E(r) 
ℴ 
Figure 4. The Efficient Frontier of Risky Assets with the Optimal CAL 
(Bodie et al. 2014: 292.) 
CML 
Efficient 
Frontier 
M 
ℴM 
E(r
m
) 
E(r) 
ℴ 
Figure 5. The Efficient Frontier and the Capital Market Line 
(Bodie et al. 2014: 292.) 
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3.2. The Arbitrage pricing theory 
An arbitrage is an opportunity in which investor may earn profits without any risk. Four 
example, to buy an asset X on the New York’s stock exchange and then selling the same 
instrument X at the higher price on the London stock exchange. That situation would not be 
possible in case of if markets would be effective. That chance of arbitrage disappears rapidly 
because each investor wants to take an as large position as possible, thus investors bring back 
the equilibrium of the price. The equilibrium is also known as the Law of One Price, which 
states if two securities are equivalent in all economic aspects, then they should have the same 
market price as well. (Bodie et al. 2011: 351-354; Brealey & Myers 1991: 169-170.) 
Stephen Ross (1976) was the first who introduced the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) and like 
CAPM, the APT links expected returns to risk and forecasts a security market line. The APT 
provides three key assumptions: first, assets yield can be presented by a factor model. Sec-
ond, there are enough securities on the market to diversify away unsystematic risk. Third, 
well-functioning security markets do not permit the stability of arbitrage opportunities. The 
APT does not determine what those factors are, there could be a currency factor, an interest 
rate factors or even an oil price factor. The APT states that the expected risk premium on a 
share depends on the expected risk premium associated with each factor as well as the stock’s 
sensibility to each factor. (Bodie et al. 2011: 351-354; Brealey & Myers 1991: 169-170.) 
The APT can be shown as: 
 
(2) Ri =  + b1(rfactor 1) + b2(rfactor 2) + … + ej 
Where, 
 Ri = Return 
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  = Is a constant for the asset 
 b1 = Expected risk premium associated with the sensitivity of
  factor 1 
 b2 = Expected risk premium associated with the sensitivity of
  factor 2 
 ej = Asset’s idiosyncratic risk 
 
The APT stands that estimated expected returns depend on evaluated factors and variables 
such as the standard deviation, (highly correlated with estimated expected returns), do not 
add any extra explanatory capability to that of the factor loadings (Roll & Ross 1980). 
 
3.3. The Fama-French (FF) Five-Factor Model 
Eugene Fama and Kenneth French (2015) represents the Three-Factor Model in 1993, which 
have come to lead empirical model to analyse stock returns. The Three-Factor Model analyse 
the relation between size and average return and the relation between average price ratios 
such as B/M and average returns.  
In 2015, Fama & French added two other factors (profitability and investment) to the model 
and now it is known as the Five-Factor Model. The model can be presented as follows: 
 
(3) Rit = i + RMt + SMBt + HMLt +RMW + CMA  + eit 
  
Where,  SMB  = Small Minus Big, (size factor) thus the return of small stock 
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  portfolios minus the return of large stock portfolios. 
 HML  = High Minus Low, (value factor) thus the return of stock 
  portfolios with a high book-to-market ratio minus the return of a
  stock portfolio with a low book-to-market ratio. 
 RMW = Robust Minus Weak, (profitability factor) is the difference of 
  diversified portfolio’s stock returns with robust and weak
  profitability 
 CMA = Conservative Minus Aggressive, (investment factor), is the 
  difference of diversified portfolio’s returns with high and low 
  investment companies 
 
Fama and French have chosen factors SMB and HML because of long-standing observations 
that corporate funding (company size) and book-to-market ratio forecast deflection of aver-
age stock returns that corresponding with the CAMP. The model’s empirical grounds have 
been justified by Fama and French: HML and SMB are not themselves significant candidates 
for essential risk factors because of those variables might proxy for unknown fundamental 
variables. Fama and French represent that companies with high book-to-market ratios are 
more likely to be in financial suffering and small stocks might be more sensitive to changes 
in business circumstances. In this case, the variables may take sensitivity to risk factors in 
the macro economy. (Bodie et al. 2014: 340-341.)  
When Fama & French added profitability and investment factors to the model, they noticed 
that the value factor (HML) came redundant for describing the average returns. They also 
find an evidence that the portfolios with small stocks with negative exposures to CMA and 
RMW are the biggest asset pricing problems in their empirical tests. (Fama & French 2015.) 
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3.4. Dividend Discount Model 
John B. Williams introduced the Dividend Discount Model (DDM) in 1936 and now it is one 
of the most used valuation models. The DDM describes how the value of the company is 
determined using future dividends. Thus, the intrinsic value of the stock is the present value 
of the dividend that will be earned at the end of the first year. Future values and dividends 
are unknown hence variables will be only estimated. On the other hand, dividends can be 
hard to forecast for a longer period, thus something other such as cash or earnings should be 
predicted instead of dividends. Even slightly deviation of the forecast has a significant impact 
on the stock price thus the prediction used by the DDM must be as accurate as possible. If 
there are no expected dividend payoffs, then the model assumes that the stock has no value 
at all. To use the DDM correctly, it must be assumed that investors are expecting some pay-
ments in the future. The model is seen a kind of umbrella model over the other discount 
models and those models are compared in terms of their formulas for the terminal value for 
the DDM. (Bodie et al. 2014: 591-596; Penman 1998.) 
The basic formula of DDM is written as: 
 
(4) 𝑉0 = 
D1
1+𝑘 
 + 
D2
(1+𝑘)2 
 + 
D3
(1+𝑘)3 
 + … + 
Dt
(1+𝑘)𝑡 
 
 
where,  V0  = Current share price 
 Dt  = Dividend payments at time t 
 k  = Required rate of return 
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3.5. The Constant-Growth Model 
Using the DDM without any growth predictions is not pleasing because it demands dividend 
forecast for every single year into the inaccurate future. Myron J. Gordon (1956) introduced 
the Dividend Discount Model with growth assumption and it is better known as the Constant-
Growth DDM or the Gordon’s Model.  
The Gordon’s Model is derived from the basic formula of DDM and growth assumption has 
been added to it: 
 
(5) 𝑉0 = 
𝐷1
𝑘−𝑔 
 
 
where, g  = is a growth rate of dividends 
 
The Gordon’s Model is universally used thus there are some limitations and implications. 
The model is only valid when g (growth rate) is smaller than k (rate of return) otherwise the 
value of the stock cannot be calculated. Also, a share value will be greater if its expected 
dividend is larger and if its expected growth rate is higher. (Bodie et al. 2014: 591-598.) 
 
3.6. Free cash flow 
An alternative approach to the DDM values is to use a company’s free cash flow (FCF). The 
free cash flow is available to the firm and its shareholders net of capital expenditures. This 
model is useful if the company does not pay dividends at all, so using the DDM is not rea-
sonable. (Bodie et al. 2014: 618.) 
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The FCF can be presented as follows: 
 
(6) FCF = EBIT (1 - tc) + Depreciation – Capital expenditures – Increase in NWC 
 
Where,  EBIT = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
 tc  = The corporate tax rate 
 NWC = Net Working Capital 
 
As the DDM, the FCF uses a terminal value to evade adding the present values of an infinite 
sum of cash flows. The terminal value can be the present value of a constant growth for 
eternity or it can be based on EBIT-multiple, earnings, book value or free cash flow. There 
is a universal rule that estimates of natural value depend on terminal value. (Bodie et al. 2014: 
618.) 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), FCF and DDM should provide the same estimate 
intrinsic value if it is possible to determine a time period in which the company start to pay 
dividends that grow constantly.  
 
3.7. Discounted cash flow (DCF) 
The discounted cash flow (DCF) is a valuation method to estimate the value of the company 
by expected total free cash flows and discounting them to the present value. Company’s value 
today is always equal with the future cash flows that are discounted at the discount rate. The 
model based on the idea of the time value of money, thus a dollar today is worth more than 
a dollar tomorrow. As mentioned above, calculating present value, an investor must discount 
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expected cash flows by the rate of return presented by an equivalent investment in the capital 
market. That rate is called the discount rate, hurdle rate or opportunity cost of capital. 
(Brealey, Myers & Allen 2012.) 
The DCF model is written as: 
 
(7) PV =  
𝐶𝑡
(1+𝑟𝑡)𝑡
 
where, 
 PV = Present Value 
 Ct = Cash flow at time t 
 rt = Discount rate 
 t = Time 
 
The DCF is used to calculate the internal rate of return, thus the Net Present Value (NPV) is 
zero. The internal rate of return is often used in finance because it is a very useful model to 
find reasonable investments but as other discount models, it can be a misleading measure-
ment if the numbers are inaccurate. (Brealey & Myers 1991: 30-90.) 
To determine NPV, we may use the model above and add initial cash flow, Co, to it 
Now the model is written as below: 
(8) PV = 𝐶𝑜  
𝐶𝑡
(1+𝑟𝑡)𝑡
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4. ANALYSTS ROLE IN THE STOCK MARKET 
 
Stock market analysts are providing a significant part of the stock analyses and it is utilized 
by the fund managers in the equity markets. The analyses based on internal and external data, 
thus it is important to recognize the quality of the information and exploit it to create robust 
analyses and forecasts. Brokerage-firms provide a lot of background information and the 
analysts’ goal is to create forecasts of which fund manager decide is it valuable or not. 
(Dimson & Marsh 1984.) The recommendations can be dived in five categories: strong buy 
(1), buy (2), hold (3), sell (4) and strong sell (5) (Stickel 1995). 
 
4.1. Who are the analysts?  
Utilizing information and creating analyses is expensive thus brokerage-houses are using 
millions of dollars per year convincing investors that specific share is under- or overvalued 
and more attractive than other stocks. Even though, the research based on company-specific 
information such as earnings announcements or annual reports, still, the analysing is more 
predictive and evaluative. (Womack 1996.) 
The semi-strong form of the EMH points that traders should not be able to earn profits that 
based on publicly available information which also recommendations are. However, broker-
age-firms are using large amounts of money to analyse companies because they themselves 
and their customers believe that they can earn abnormal returns. (Barber, Lehavy and True-
man research 2001.) 
Research analyst may have a good relationship with the firm management, thus they are 
providing analyses for investment banks that are serving institutional clients who provide a 
commission to their brokers. To achieve these targets, there may be incentives that drive the 
analyst to create analyses, although the analyses may be biased. Analysts forecasts seems to 
have a significant increasing impact on brokerage-company’s stock price and that may be the 
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reason why brokerage-companies are incentivising market researchers. For example, strong 
buy and buy have a significantly greater effect on the trading activity rather than other (strong 
sell, sell, hold) recommendations. In that case, the incentives may lead analysts to give more 
easily buy or strong buy recommendation. (Irvine 2004.) Womack (1996) research shows 
that traders should only pay to brokerage-houses if they are expecting that the benefit is 
greater than the cost of the analyses.  
Womack (1996) also finds that an incorrect sell recommendation may be riskier for an ana-
lyst’s reputation rather than an incorrect buy recommendation because sell recommendation 
is more visible and less desirable. Womack came to the conclusion that an analyst’s expected 
compensation should be higher if the costs of sell recommendation are riskier. 
According to Lin & McNichols (1998), hold recommendations have a significant negative 
impact on traders when an analysis is done by an affiliated analyst rather than a hold recom-
mendation from an independent analyst. A hold recommendation is seemed to be a bad an-
nouncement also from a company’s perspective, and a hold recommendation from an affili-
ated analyst is indicated to be an even worse announcement. Their research also stands that 
affiliated analysts are avoiding sell recommendations to sustain customer relations. They are 
also able to show that an independent analysts’ recommendations are less favourable than an 
affiliated analysts’ announcements. Even though, an affiliated analyst may be over positive, 
their analyses of earnings are not more favourable than those analyses done by an unaffiliated 
analyst.  
Schipper (1991) and Francis & Philbrick (1993) notice that researchers who are focused es-
pecially on accounting are using a lot of energy analysing and making the cash flow and 
earnings forecast. Even though, those analyses are secondary while the main goal is to create 
correct recommendations. Sell and buy recommendations are following forecasts of share 
values using all obtainable information and data of industry as well as firm-specific infor-
mation. Analyses are offering a direct test of the capability of well-informed market partici-
pants to perform better than the stock markets on average. (Womack 1996.) 
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4.2. Factors that are affecting price-reaction 
According to Fama’s EMH, new information should reflect rapidly in a security’s price and 
it is said that the EMH is an exact description of price behaviour in the stock markets. The 
information hypothesis means that when a large piece of stock is sold in the market, the price 
is expected to fall and this decreasing is the expected value of the information contained in 
the stock trades. The adjustment should be a permanent and not a temporary change followed 
by abnormal returns in the future, as the price pressure hypothesis supposes. The price pres-
sure effect leads to a temporary price adjustment in the stock prices which will revert over 
time. (Scholes 1972; Barber & Loeffler 1993.) 
Womack (1996) found a robust evidence that analyst’s recommendations have a significant 
impact on stock prices, and that effect is not only at the immediate time of the recommenda-
tion announcement but also in following weeks. Womack’s research concludes that sell rec-
ommendation may harm a brokerage-house’s potential and present investment banking rela-
tions and that may restrict access to information if an analyst gives unfavourable recommen-
dations. Womack concludes three different empirical results; (i) The first reaction to changes 
in the recommendation appears to be permanent. Thus, the recommendations contain a sig-
nificant information for which a brokerage-house must be compensated. (ii) The changes 
seem to be mostly unsolved problems and those findings can be categorized on underreaction 
and subsequent changes associated with an announcement events such as stock repurchases, 
earnings announcements or dividend initiations. (iii) Analysts’ new buy recommendations 
seem to appear seven times often than new sell recommendations thus analysts are not happy 
to give sell recommendations because the costs of giving sell recommendations are larger. 
Brokerage-companies’ sell and buy recommendations have a short-term price impact on 
share prices which consists of the six different components: the reputation of the analyst, the 
strength of the recommendation, the size of the brokerage-firm, the size of the recommended 
company, the change in recommendation and contemporaneous earnings forecast revision. 
(Stickel 1995.) Those components are described below. 
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According to Stickel (1995), the reputation of the analyst affects stock prices stronger if the 
reputation is better. Stickel (1992) found direct evidence of the positive relationship between 
performance, reputation and stock prices, thus analyst with great performance record and 
reputation may create greater impact rather than an analyst whose record is not that impres-
sive. Sorescu & Subrahmanyam (2006) find that the abnormal returns are significantly neg-
ative after large recommendation changes done by the stock analyst who is employed by less 
approved brokerage-house or who is inexperienced. 
Stickel (1995) created a hypothesis that various recommendations have a different level of 
the strength. In that case, the strength of recommendations depends on analyst’s signals, for 
example, a buy recommendation signal tells that the firm is undervalued in the stock markets 
and then strong buy recommendation tells that the firm is even more undervalued. Because 
of that the stock price should react stronger to strong buy signal rather buy signal. 
The size of the brokerage-house causes a price-reaction in short-term and sell or buy recom-
mendations from large brokerage-firm have a stronger influence to prices than a recommen-
dation by a smaller brokerage-company. The reason for this is because larger companies have 
more sale personnel and they may create a higher price effect. (Stickel 1995.) Womack 
(1996) found that recommendations by the large well-known brokerage-house are mainly 
based on well-followed stocks. 
The fourth hypothesis stands that the size of the recommended firm influence on prices, thus 
larger firms have smaller price reaction to sell or buy recommendations than smaller firms. 
That is because of smaller companies’ information and data is not processed as efficiently as 
larger companies have. (Stickel 1995.) According to Womack (1996), the market reaction 
associated with larger capitalization companies is smaller than the market reaction with 
smaller capitalization companies. 
The change in recommendation hypothesis stands that skipping a rank have a great impact 
on the share prices. For example, a change in the recommendation from hold to strong buy 
has a stronger influence than a revision from hold to buy. (Stickel 1995.) Womack (1996) 
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found that the market reaction between new buy signals and new sell signals is a significantly 
asymmetric and also the new sell recommendation has a stronger influence on markets. 
The last hypothesis, contemporaneous earnings forecast revision have a greater impact on 
stock prices than recommendations that are done without a corresponding revision of the 
earnings forecast. (Stickel 1995.) 
 
4.2.1. Dartboard research 
The “Dartboard” column is a contest that is testing the efficient market hypothesis and it is 
published monthly in the Wall Street Journal. It contains a stock recommendation by four 
professional portfolio manager and strategist. Those stocks picked by experts are competing 
against the random selections of four general darts. Beginning of the month, four profession-
als are selecting the one stock that they believe to generate mostly profit over six months and 
the stock must be traded on the NASDAQ, American or New York stock exchange. Eventu-
ally after six months, those picks will be compared with the random selection of four darts. 
Some of the studies conclude that a price pressure effect has created abnormal returns but, 
on the other hand, some of the researchers have come to the conclusion that an information 
effect causes abnormal returns. (Barber & Loeffler 1993; Metcalf & Malkiel 1994.) 
Metcalf & Malkiel (1994) did not find any evidence that the stocks chose by experts can 
outperform the markets systematically, even though the gross return data seem to assume that 
the expert’s picks reach excess returns. The professionals tend to choose riskier shares that 
are performing worse than the darts after controlling for risk. During the six-month compe-
tition, the darts over-perform 15 times with 6.9% abnormal return meanwhile the profession-
als beat the markets 18 times with 9.5% abnormal returns. Researchers conclude that if the 
market would be fully efficient, the probability of the darts’ or experts’ portfolios to win 
competition should be equal.  
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Barber & Loeffler (1993) find that stocks picked by professionals achieved over 4% abnor-
mal returns for the two days after the announcement of the recommendation. They also notice 
that around half of this abnormal return revert during 25 trading days. Correspondingly, the 
Dartboard stocks did not achieve abnormal returns at all during the observation period. This 
research proves their hypothesis of the price pressure that some of the traders buy and sell 
securities based on experts’ recommendations which leads to a temporary price response in 
that particular stock. The fact that a part of the price reaction is sustainable the recommenda-
tion may include some robust information. Albert Jr. and Smaby (1996) get similar results as 
Barber & Loeffler had a few years earlier. Assets picked by the expert in the Dartboard indi-
cate meaningful positive return over the 50-day period following the two-day publication 
date reaction. However, Alber Jr’s and Smaby’s results differ from Barber’s and Loeffler’s 
results, as their research shows that the results are consistent with an information effect 
whereas Barber’s and Loeffler’s results are based on a price pressure effect. 
Liang (1999) finds that there is a 2-day announcement effect after the analysts’ stock recom-
mendation. During the first 15 days the announcement effect is reversed and actually that 
effect based on analysts’ past track record. Liang notices that if the analyst’s recommendation 
record in the past is great, then naive investors make their investment decisions based on that, 
even though the past is not a guarantee of the future. According to Liangs’ study, the price 
pressure hypothesis assumes that the analyst’s recommendation creates temporary buying 
pressure by naive traders and that buying pressure may create abnormal returns temporarily. 
On the other hand, the information effect predicts that analysts have inside information and 
their recommendations contain that inside information and then it creates temporary abnor-
mal returns. Liang’s research concludes that there is an information leakage just before new 
recommendation hence both, abnormal returns and trading volumes, have a significant posi-
tive effect for the analyst’s stock. 
According to Ferraro’s and Stanley’s research (2000), either the Dartboard stocks or picked 
stocks by experts cannot create a significant abnormal return over time. But an analyst who 
earned abnormal returns in the previous competition is achieving significantly higher stock 
price performance than those who underperformed. 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
4.3. Strategies that based on recommendations 
According to Barber et. al. (2001), it is possible to earn abnormal returns by following ana-
lyst’s recommendations. Investors should buy stocks that are the most highly recommended 
and in contrast, investors should sell short stocks that are the least favourable recommended 
by analysts. Investors should daily rebalance their portfolios and follow the analyst’s con-
sensus recommendations. 
Barber et. al. (2001) findings show that buying shares that have a positive consensus recom-
mendation with balanced daily portfolios along with right timely reactions to recommenda-
tion may cause over 4% annual abnormal returns.  
Barber et. al (2001) find that buying the shares with the highest consensus recommendation 
create almost 19% an annual return while buying the stocks with the least favourable con-
sensus recommendation create approximately 6% annual profits. In contrast, a value 
weighted market portfolio outperformed 14.5 % annual return during the same period. Thus, 
a portfolio with the highest recommendation created over 4% abnormal returns and the less 
favourable portfolio’s abnormal return was almost -5% after controlling for factors such as 
market risk, price momentum and book-to-market effects. In addition, the best recommended 
shares outperformed the less favourable recommended stocks by 102 basis points per month. 
(Barber et. al. 2001) 
Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische and Lee (2004) study shows that analysts prefer to give higher rec-
ommendations to stocks that have high trading volume and positive earnings and price mo-
mentum. Those shares tend to have higher sales growth and its earnings are expected to in-
crease fast in the future. In addition, those shares may have greater valuation multiples as 
well. Researches find that recommendations are positively correlated with momentum strat-
egy and recommendations are negatively correlated with contrarian investment strategy. 
Thus analysts are preferring high momentum shares and growth stocks in their recommen-
dations. Jegadeesh et. al. (2004) also find that the level of the recommendation is not that 
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robust as the power of the change is. Thus, there may have some relevant information con-
tained with the analyst’s changes in the recommendation. In conclusion, an investor may earn 
abnormal returns by following the momentum strategy and following the change of recom-
mendations. 
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5. DATA & METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Data 
This study’s data based on daily consensus stock recommendation from the Thomson Reuters 
database. The data contains all the stocks from Finnish exchange market (OMXH), stocks’ 
daily returns, OMXH PI-index and 3-month daily Euribor is used as a risk-free rate. The 
observation period is from January 2010 to the end of October 2018. This thesis manages 
stocks and recommendations only if a company have gotten recommendations for a whole 
observation period. Companies have been removed if they have been sold, they have not 
gotten any recommendations or they have been moved off from OMXH. After this screening, 
62 companies met these terms. The consensus stock recommendations are the average of all 
the recommendations provided by analysts and the scale of recommendation is as formed as 
follows: 1 = Strong Buy, 2 = Buy, 3 = Hold, 4 = Sell and 5 = Strong Sell. The portfolios are 
constructed based on the mean of the recommendations. When a company is given a recom-
mendation, it is added to one of the portfolios above, and the company’s return is calculated. 
When the consensus recommendation changes, the company will be moved to another port-
folio and the return will be recalculated. 
Also, there will be tested abnormal returns statistical significance by panel data methods. 
This part of the study consists of also daily consensus stock recommendations, but in this 
case, there have been constructed three portfolios instead of five; “Buy”, “Hold” and “Sell”. 
Strong Buy and Strong Sell consensus stock recommendations have been included in the 
“Buy” and the “Sell” portfolios. In that case, we can see what an impact is when extremity 
recommendations are included to more common recommendations. 
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5.2 Methods of the OLS regression 
This part of the study focuses on to examine whether there is a possibility to achieve abnor-
mal returns by following analysts’ stock recommendation in the Finnish stock market or not. 
There are five consensus portfolios that are updated if a company’s recommendation has been 
changed. Stocks’ daily returns are compared to OMXH-index’s returns in the same period. 
The first portfolio contains all the stocks that have gotten consensus recommendation “Strong 
Buy”, thus its average is 1 ≤ 𝑥it ≤ 1,5 at time t-1. The second portfolio contains stocks whose 
consensus recommendations are ”Buy” and its average is 1,5 < 𝑥it ≤ 2,5, the third portfolio 
is formed from stocks whose recommendations are  “Hold” and the mean is 2,5 < 𝑥it ≤ 3,5. 
The fourth portfolio contains stock that has a consensus recommendation “Sell” and the av-
erage is 3,5 < 𝑥it ≤ 4,5 and the last portfolio “Strong Sell” contains stocks whose consensus 
is 4,5 < 𝑥it ≤ 5. Then the consensus recommendation is calculated as a weighted average and 
the formula is shown below: 
 
(9) 𝑥it = 
1
𝑛𝑖𝑡
∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑗=1
 
in which 𝑥it is the average of the recommendation for a company i at time t, nit is a number 
of the recommendations and Xijt is an individual recommendation for a company i at time t. 
The stock returns of each company are calculated by natural logarithm thus the results are 
then comparable. Daily returns of each company based on the cumulative returns of each 
individual stock returns’ average and the formula is shown below: 
 
(10) Rit = ∑ 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑡
𝑡=1   
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in which, Rit is a daily return of an individual stock i, Rit is a daily stock return at time t and 
nt is a number of trading days in a current month. 
Portfolios returns are then calculated as a weighted average of individual stocks returns and 
the formula is as follow: 
 
(11) 𝑃it = 
1
𝑛𝑖𝑡
∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1  
in which 𝑃it is the daily return of portfolio p, Xit is stock’s i daily return at time t and n is a 
number of stocks in the portfolio. The returns of portfolio Rpt are then compared to the mar-
ket return Rmt (OMXH), thus the excess returns ARpt can be calculated. The formula is 
shown below: 
 
(12) ARpt = Rpt - Rpt 
 
The statistical significance of portfolios’ returns is examined by Jensen’s alpha and CAP-
model. Portfolios’ returns and market returns reduced by risk-free rate (3 month Euribor) is 
placed in the equation (13) according to CAP-model and then the alpha of each portfolio can 
be calculated. The betas are calculated annually for each portfolio. The regression model is 
shown below: 
 
(13) (Rpt – Rf) =  +  (Rmt – Rf) 
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where Rpt is the return of the portfolio, Rf is the risk-free rate,   is the intercept,  is the 
beta of the portfolio and Rmt is the market return. 
Sharpe (1966) introduced a measure, reward-to-variability-ratio, also known as a Sharpe-
ratio, for the portfolio’s performance. The Sharpe-ratio describes a portfolio’s risk-adjusted 
return and the better ratio is, the better is the portfolio’s risk-adjusted performance. If the 
Sharpe-ratio is negative, then the return is expected to be negative or the risk-free rate is 
higher than the portfolio’s total return. In that case, the Sharpe-ratio does not provide any 
valuable purpose. The formula of Sharpe-ratio can be written: 
 
(14) Sharpe Ratio = 
𝑅𝑝−𝑅𝑓
𝜎𝑝
 
 
Where, Rp = Return of portfolio 
 Rf = Risk-Free rate 
 p = Standard deviation 
 
Jack Treynor (1973) developed another risk measure for portfolios’ performance. It is known 
as the Treynor-ratio or the reward-to-volatility ratio that describes how much excess return 
was produced for each unit of market risk. The Treynor’s ratio is a sensitivity to changes in 
beta or market risk, thereby, diversification cannot eliminate that risk. The greater Treynor-
ratio is better. The formula of Treynor-ratio can be shown as below: 
 
(15) Treynor Ratio = 
𝑅𝑝−𝑅𝑓
𝛽
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Where, Rp = Return of portfolio 
 Rf = Risk-Free rate 
  = Beta, market risk 
 
5.3. Methods of panel data models 
This part manages the methods of the second part of the thesis in which there will be exam-
ined what is an impact of buy, hold and sell stock recommendations on stock prices and 
returns. More specific, there will be investigated what is an impact on stock returns when the 
recommendation changes from one to another. As mentioned before, there are three consen-
sus portfolios that are “Buy”, “Hold” and “Sell” portfolios instead of five portfolios that were 
used in the OLS regression. Those portfolios are constructed by consensus stock recommen-
dations and strong buy and strong sell recommendations are included to the “Buy” and the 
“Sell” portfolios. Stock returns are calculated in the same way that was in earlier part, thus 
the stock returns are calculated by natural logarithm therefore returns are comparable.  
This part of the thesis focus on the panel data methods thus the study’s data have both cross-
sectional and time series elements. The panel of data will consist of an information across 
space and time and the panel maintain same objects and it measures them over time (Brooks 
2008). 
There is used the Hausman Test (also known as a specification test) to observe endogenous 
the predictor variables in a regression model. The Hausman Test examines whether the pre-
dictor variables are endogenous or not and the model also sort out which model should be 
used in the analysis, the random effect model or the fixed effect model. If the assumptions of 
the random effect model do not hold, then the random effect model is less efficient than the 
fixed effect model. (Hausman 1978.) 
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There are three types of panel models that can be used to analyse this study’s portfolio’s data; 
the fixed effects model, the random effects model and the mixed likelihood model. 
The fixed effect model is a statistical model in which intercepts are correlated with including 
variables. The model’s estimators are fixed unlike in the random effect model in which pa-
rameters are random variables. Also a dummy variable can be added to the fixed effect model. 
(Brooks 2008.) 
The fixed effect model can be shown as below: 
 
(16) yit =  + xit + it + it,  it = i+ it   
 
where, yit is the dependent variable and  is the intercept term and the  is a k x 1 vector of 
parameters to be calculated on the explanatory variables. The term xit is a 1 x k vector of 
findings on the explanatory variables. The it is an error term. It can be said that the term it 
encapsulates all the variables that have an impact on the dependent variable yit and it does 
not vary over time. The term it captures everything unexplained things that other variables 
cannot explain about dependent variable yit. (Brooks 2008.) 
The other model that is used is known as the random effect model which approach considers 
different intercept terms for each factor and those intercepts are constant over time and then, 
the relationship between the explained and explanatory variables supposed to be an equal 
both temporally and cross-sectionally. And the including variables are not correlated with 
the independent variables. (Brooks 2008.) 
The random effects model is a little bit modified and it can be written as below: 
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(17) yit =  + xit + it,   it = I + it 
 
where, xit is a 1 x k vector of explanatory variables but there is no dummy variable as it was 
in the fixed effect model. In the random effect model, the term I captures the heterogeneity 
in the cross-sectional dimension. The  and  are same terms as they were in the equation X. 
(Brooks 2008.) 
The maximum likelihood is a statistical method that is used to estimate all the possible equa-
tions of the data thereby all the parameters that are selected are most likely to generate the 
observed data. The maximum likelihood method can find parameter values for both non-
linear and linear models. Together with the maximum likelihood method, there is used a 
bootstrap simulation to reach a description of empirical estimators. (Brooks 2008.)  
In each previously mentioned model, there is also used lagged method to estimate the impact 
of returns of the previous day on today’s stock prices in which the independent variable “re-
turns” is lagged. It allows regarding results in different perspective. 
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6. EMPIRICAL PART 
 
This chapter introduces the empirical part of the study. There are hypothesis that were pre-
sented in the introduction and the hypothesis are shown below again. The hypothesis will be 
tested by several statistical methods to find out the statistical significance of the hypothesis 
and the results are shown in this chapter. 
 
The hypotheses are written as follows: 
H0: Portfolios based on recommendations cannot generate positive abnormal returns 
H1: Portfolios based on recommendations can generate positive abnormal returns 
 
 
6.1 Portfolios  
The portfolios are constructed based on their consensus recommendation that was presented 
in the chapter “Data & Methodology”. This chapter presents each portfolio’s structure and 
measurement of performance such as Jensen’s alphas, Sharpe ratios, Treynor ratios, betas 
and standard deviations. Based on those metrics, portfolios can be compared and thereby 
seen which portfolios have performed best and which portfolios worst. 
Table 1 contains numbers of the recommendations in each portfolio. As can be seen, the 
“Strong Buy” and the “Strong Sell” portfolio’s observations are the lowest ones thus analysts 
are not favourable to give extremity recommendations. The “Hold” portfolio contains most 
recommendations (75383), the “Buy” second most (45233) and the “Sell” portfolio got ap-
proximately 15000 recommendations. About 54% of the recommendations are holds, 33% 
are buys, 11% are sells and then there is a small sample of recommendations for strong buy 
 
 
45 
 
 
and strong sell. This support assumption that analysts prefer to give a hold or buy recommen-
dation than a sell recommendation. 
Table 1. Number of the recommendations  
Year 
Strong 
Buy 
Buy Hold Sell 
Strong 
Sell 
Total  Total (%) 
      
  
2010 110 5176 9052 1812 32 16182 11,63 
2011 199 5598 8990 891 442 16120 11,58 
2012 449 5163 5163 1314 489 12578 9,04 
2013 112 3439 10434 1893 304 16182 11,63 
2014 245 4623 8865 2041 408 16182 11,63 
2015 296 5822 8400 1604 60 16182 11,63 
2016 99 5659 8325 2099 0 16182 11,63 
2017 0 4693 9451 1704 272 16120 11,58 
2018 101 5060 6703 1378 212 13454 9,67 
           
Total 1611 45233 75383 14736 2219 139182   
        
Total (%) 1,16 32,50 54,16 10,59 1,59   100 
 
 
Table 2 represents portfolios’ and benchmark’s annual returns. As can be seen, the order of 
the portfolios is as expected thus the “Strong Buy” portfolio achieved highest returns mean-
while the “Sell” and the “Strong Sell” portfolio performed worst.  
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Table 2. Annual returns of portfolios and market returns 
Year Strong Buy Buy Hold Sell Strong Sell OMXH 
       
2010 -0,88 % 26,69 % 18,64 % -17,08 % -5,80 % 17,12 % 
2011 -8,47 % -34,13 % -38,30 % -48,22 % -35,07 % -35,82 % 
2012 14,50 % 15,96 % -0,35 % 19,20 % -4,09 % 8,00 % 
2013 31,40 % 18,82 % 17,60 % 6,89 % 56,95 % 23,48 % 
2014 7,64 % 1,65 % -6,34 % -6,69 % -35,68 % 5,59 % 
2015 81,79 % 26,60 % 13,13 % -7,78 % -1,74 % 10,25 % 
2016 5,35 % 6,89 % 15,01 % -7,24 % 0,00 % 3,49 % 
2017 0,00 % 5,17 % 8,09 % 8,83 % 4,75 % 6,21 % 
2018 6,48 % -11,05 % -12,79 % -41,63 % -14,09 % -3,27 % 
       
 Total 137,81 % 56,61 % 14,70 % -93,71 % -34,77 % 35,05 % 
Annual average 15,31 % 6,29 % 1,63 % -10,41 % -3,86 % 3,89 % 
Monthly average 1,28 % 0,52 % 0,14 % -0,87 % -0,32 % 0,32 % 
 
The “Strong Buy” portfolio achieved the highest total returns (137,81%) and it has performed 
negative return only in one year when its return was -0,88%. Even though, the total perfor-
mance of “Strong Buy” portfolio is the highest, still it was not the best portfolio in all the 
years. As can be seen, the “Strong Sell” was able to achieve higher returns in some years 
than the “Strong Buy” portfolio, even though, overall its returns are negative. The “Buy” 
portfolio’s total return is a positive (56,61%) and it has performed very well except years 
2011 and 2018 when its total return was negative. It is interesting that the “Buy” portfolio 
achieved its the highest return in 2010, in the same year when the “Strong Buy” portfolio’s 
return was negative. 
The “Hold” portfolio achieved positive total returns (14,70) and it was able to perform neg-
atively only in four years. The “Sell” portfolio’s returns were negative (-93,71%) and actually 
its total performance is the worst comparing to other portfolios.  The “Sell” portfolio reached 
a positive return only in 2012, 2013 and 2017. The “Strong Sell” portfolio’s total perfor-
mance is negative while it achieved -34,77% total returns, even it has the highest return 
(56,95%) in 2013 when it beat all the other portfolios.  
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Only the “Strong Buy” and the “Buy” portfolios could beat the benchmark portfolio, OMXH 
which reached 35,05% total returns. The OMXH achieved positive returns in all years except 
in 2011 and 2018. None of the year its return was not the highest compared to other five 
portfolios. 
 
Figure 6. Annual returns of portfolios and OMX-index 
 
Figure 6 shows market returns graphically, thus it can be seen that in some years all the 
portfolios performed poorly. For example, in 2011 none of the portfolios achieved positive 
returns. It may be due to the financial crisis that caused by Euro-zone problems. On the other 
hand, there are years such as 2013 and 2017 when all the portfolios achieved positive returns. 
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Table 3. Portfolios’ return reduced by a market return 
Year Strong Buy Buy Hold Sell Strong Sell 
 
     
2010 -18,01 % 9,57 % 1,52 % -34,20 % -22,92 % 
2011 27,36 % 1,69 % -2,47 % -12,40 % 0,75 % 
2012 6,49 % 7,96 % -8,35 % 11,20 % -12,10 % 
2013 7,92 % -4,67 % -5,88 % -16,59 % 33,46 % 
2014 2,05 % -3,93 % -11,93 % -12,27 % -41,27 % 
2015 71,54 % 16,35 % 2,88 % -18,03 % -11,99 % 
2016 1,86 % 3,40 % 11,52 % -10,73 % -3,49 % 
2017 -6,21 % -1,03 % 1,89 % 2,63 % -1,45 % 
2018 9,75 % -7,77 % -9,52 % -38,36 % -10,81 % 
      
Total 102,76 % 21,56 % -20,35 % -128,77 % -69,82 % 
            
Annual average 11,42 % 2,40 % -2,26 % -14,31 % -7,76 % 
Monthly average 0,95 % 0,20 % -0,19 % -1,19 % -0,65 % 
 
Table 3 shows the return of portfolios reduced by a market return (OMXH). As we can see, 
only the “Strong Buy” portfolio and the “Buy” achieved positive total returns and outper-
formed OMXH-index. The “Strong Buy” portfolio was not able to outperform OMXH-index 
in 2010 and 2017, thus in other years it beat the benchmark. Its total return is by far the 
highest. Also, the “Buy” portfolio has reached excess returns in five years and its total ab-
normal returns are 21,56%. 
Even though, the “Hold” portfolio’s market return was positive, it could not achieve excess 
returns comparing to the benchmark index OMXH. There are some years when the “Hold” 
portfolio’ achieved excess returns but as a whole its return is negative. The “Sell” portfolio’s 
performance is the worst and it was able to beat the OMXH only twice, in 2012 and 2017. 
The “Strong Sell” portfolio has outperformed as the OMXH in 2011 and 2013. In other years 
it could not achieve excess returns and its total returns were -69,82%. 
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Table 4. Portfolio’s measurements  
  Strong Buy Buy Hold Sell Strong Sell 
Std. 0,27 0,19 0,19 0,22 0,27 
Beta 0,17 0,65 1,10 0,57 0,04 
Sharpe 0,55 0,31 0,07 -0,48 -0,15 
Treynor ratio 0,89 0,07 0,01 -0,19 -1,09 
 
As can be seen from Table 4, all the portfolios have a positive beta and the values are between 
0,04 to 1,10. The “Hold” portfolio’s beta value is near one thus that portfolio is following the 
market best. The “Buy” and the “Sell” portfolios have almost same betas thus those portfolios 
follow market reaction same way. The “Strong Buy” and the “Strong Sell” have the lowest 
betas thus those portfolios react least to the market changes. 
Comparing standard deviations, it can be seen that the “Hold” portfolio has the lowest vola-
tility (18,60%) and the “Strong Buy” portfolio and the “Strong Sell” portfolio have the high-
est volatilities. Other portfolios’ standard deviations are around 20%. 
Sharpe ratios are as expected based on portfolios performance, thus the “Strong Portfolio” 
has the best ratio (0,55) and the “Sell” portfolio’s Sharpe is the lowest one. Also, the “Buy” 
and the “Hold” portfolios reached positive Sharpe ratios. Treynor Ratios are also following 
very well portfolios’ performance, thereby the “Strong Buy” portfolio, the “Buy” portfolio 
and the “Sell” portfolio reached positive ratios and the “Sell” and the “Strong Sell” portfolios 
reward-to-volatility ratio as a negative, as was the Sharpe ratios.  
 
6.2. Results of the OLS regression analysis 
The regression analysis measures if the results of abnormal results are statistically significant 
or not for the period from January 2010 to October 2018. The regression analysis is done by 
the simple linear regression model, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Each portfolio’s returns 
are calculated and after that returns are regressed by using the market-model to find out the 
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statistical significance of the Jensen’s alpha. The results of the regression analysis are pre-
sented in table 5. 
 
Table 5. The results of the Ordinary Least Squares 
Method: Ordinary Least 
Squares           
Observation period              1/1/2010 - 31/10/2018   
  
   
Dependent variable Variables     Std. Error 
  
 
  𝛼 OMXH  𝛼 OMXH 
  
 
    
Strong Buy  0,0112*** 0,7674*** 
 0,0006 0,1401 
  (19,55) (5,51) 
   
  
     
Buy  0,002*** 0,9999*** 
 0,0002 0,0177 
  (12,24) (55,81) 
   
  
     
Hold  -0,00005 0,7280*** 
 -7,47E-05 0,0059 
  (-0,75) (121,41) 
   
  
     
Sell  -0,003*** 0,9670*** 
 0,0002 0,0354 
  (-13,34) (27,33) 
   
  
     
Strong Sell  0,0139*** 0,3501 
 0,0006 0,2961 
    (23,73) (1,18))       
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level 
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level 
 
As mentioned above, the regression is done by the OLS method, and there is one dependent 
variable (portfolio) and two other estimators which are 𝛼 and OMXH. The term 𝛼 describes 
Jensen’s alpha and OMXH is the benchmark portfolio reduced by risk-free rate. 
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As can be seen from table 5, the “Strong Buy” portfolio’s alpha is a significant at 1% level, 
thus it can be said that the results of the “Strong Buy” portfolio are highly significant. The 
“Strong Buy” portfolio’s alpha is a positive (0,0112) thus by following that portfolio, inves-
tors may achieve abnormal returns. The results of the “Strong Buy” portfolio are expected 
because stock analysts are not giving the highest recommendations unless they believe that 
a company can perform exceptionally well. When stock analysts give a strong buy recom-
mendation, they estimate that recommended company is even more undervalued and then 
investors start to buy shares of recommended company and its price increases to the right 
level. 
The “Buy” portfolio’s alpha is a slightly positive (0,002) at a 1% significance level, whereby 
the results of the Jensen’s alpha are highly significant and investors may reach abnormal 
returns by following this portfolio. The results of the buy recommendation can be thought to 
be logical thus stock analysts estimate the recommended company to be undervalued and 
then market participant react to the news and start buying the stocks of the recommended 
company and then its price increases until the under-pricing ends. 
As can be noted, the “Hold” portfolio’s Jensen’s alpha (-0,00005) is negative, however there 
cannot find statistical significant results, hence, investors are not able to achieve abnormal 
returns by following the portfolio that based on hold recommendations. As can be seen from 
table 1, the “Hold” portfolio is the largest one, while it contains over 54% of all recommen-
dations. In that case, the statistical insignificance may be due that stock analysts are giving 
easier hold recommendation than buy or sell recommendations, thus the “Hold” portfolio 
may include companies that stock analysts are uncertain. Analyst may give rather hold rec-
ommendation than sell or buy recommendation if they are uncertain of performance of ana-
lysed company.  
The “Sell” portfolio has the worst Jensen’s alpha comparing to other portfolios. Its alpha is 
a slightly negative (-0,003) at 1% significance level thus the results are highly significant and 
based on the results, investors cannot earn abnormal returns by following the “Sell” portfolio. 
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The results can be seen to be logical because the “Sell” portfolio should contain companies 
that stock analysts consider to be overvalued and their prices is assumed to decrease. 
Table 5 provides interesting results when considering the “Strong Sell” portfolio. The 
“Strong Sell” portfolio’s Jensen’s alpha is a highly significant at 1% level but the “Strong 
Sell” portfolio reach a positive alpha (0,0139), thereby investors can achieve abnormal results 
by following strong sell recommendations. The results are interesting and contrary to expec-
tations because normally the “Strong Sell” portfolio should contain companies that perform 
poorly and investors should avoid to invest them. In that case, the “Strong Sell” portfolio 
contains few observations thus individual companies’ performance is emphasized. 
It can also be noticed that the independent variable OMXH affects the portfolios. Effects are 
highly statistically significant for each portfolio at 1% level except for the “Strong Sell” port-
folio in which statistical significant results could not found. However, the significance is 
noticeably higher for the middle portfolios such as the “Hold”, the “Buy” and the “Sell” 
portfolios than for the “Strong Buy” portfolio. Therefore, those three portfolios follow market 
movement better than the “Strong Buy” portfolio. Table 5 contains also standard errors for 
the portfolio’s independent variables. As can be seen, the “Strong Buy” and the “Strong Sell” 
portfolios’ standard errors are higher than standard errors for portfolios based on buy, hold 
and sell recommendations. Therefore, the “Buy”, the “Hold” and the “Sell” portfolios are 
more stable to follow market whereas the “Strong Buy” and the “Strong Sell” portfolios are 
more unstable. The results of the standard errors are similar when another variable OMXH 
is in the review.  In addition, the “Strong Buy” and the “Strong Sell” portfolios contain fewer 
data points than those other portfolios thus their standard deviation tends to be higher. 
As a conclusion, it can be seen that it is possible to achieve abnormal returns by following 
stock recommendations. Strong buy, buy, sell and strong sell recommendations’ alphas were 
statistically highly significant, and strong buy, buy and strong sell recommendations may 
provide abnormal returns thus the null hypothesis must be rejected and then we must accept 
alternative hypothesis that stock recommendations can produce positive abnormal returns. 
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6.3 Results of panel data models 
This part of the study consists of empirical results of panel regressions in which the impact 
of stock recommendations was investigated. Using several panel data methods provide ro-
bustness test for statistical analysis. Table 6 represents descriptive and overall statistics of 
portfolios. As can be seen, the total number of companies (n) is 62 and the total number of 
observations (N) is 142 786. The term T describes time, thus there are 2303 observations 
days when stock recommendations have been issued. The mean of the “Buy” portfolio is 
0,3276, thus approximately 33% of consensus stock recommendations are targeted at buy 
recommendation. For comparison, over half of stock recommendations are getting rate hold 
thus the mean of the “Hold” portfolio is 0,5536. Eventually, the “Sell” portfolio has only 
about 12% of stock recommendations while its mean is 0,1229. 
Table 6 also provides standard deviations of each portfolio. As the “Hold” portfolio’s mean 
is the highest one as well as its overall standard deviation is with the value 0,4971. However, 
the “Buy” portfolio’s overall standard deviation (0,4693) is almost as high as the “Hold” 
portfolio has. The “Sell” portfolio has the lowest overall standard deviation with the value 
0,3283. Overall standard deviation represents the variances of each portfolio’s mean and 
then, the “between” describes variances between subgroups and then the “within” describes 
variances within subgroups. Then, it can be seen that all the values of “between” standard 
deviations are around 0,20 thus the variation between subgroups is not that large. The 
“within” standard deviation values have larger variation and those values are closer to overall 
standard deviation, thus there may have greater variability among the portfolios.  
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Table 6. Overall statistics of portfolios 
Descriptive statistics               
Variable     Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations   
  
  
      
Returns Overall  0,0001 0,02123 -2,2442 2,188 N = 142786 
  Between   0,0004 -0,0009 0,0008 n = 62 
  Within   0,0212 -2,2442 2,188 T = 2303 
          
Buy  Overall  0,3276 0,4693 0 1 N = 142786 
  Between  
 0,2333 0 0,967 n = 62 
  Within  
 0,4083 -0,6381 1,3102 T = 2303 
          
Hold  Overall  0,5536 0,4971 0 1 N = 142786 
  Between  
 0,2374 0 1 n = 62 
  Within  
 0,4378 -0,4291 1,5387 T = 2303 
    
    
  
Sell  Overall  0,1229 0,3283 0 1 N = 142786 
  Between  
 0,1712 0 0,6412 n = 62 
    Within     0,2810 -0,5188 1,1142 T = 2303 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level 
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level 
 
Table 7. represents the results of the Hausman specification test. The test sorts out which 
tests must be rejected and which tests are acceptable. According to the results, the random 
effect model cannot be rejected, thus the Prob.>Chi2 is greater than zero. If it would be equal 
to zero, then the random effect model would not be suitable. The results hold on all the three 
portfolios thereby random effect model is suitable for use. Also the fixed effect model can 
be accepted thus the results of coefficients are similar to the random effect model. As a con-
clusion, both of the models can explain the panel data regressions well enough and both 
models are suitable. 
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Table 7. The results of the Hausman specification test 
Hausman specification test         
    Coefficients         
  FE Re  FE - RE Prob.>Chi2 
    Fixed Effects Random Effects   Difference   
       
Buy  0,0004 0,0003  0,0001 0,4166 
       
Hold  -0,0001 -3,00E-05  -0,0001 0,3624 
       
Sell   -0,0005 -0,0005   -2,38E-06 0,9817 
 
 
Table 8 represents the results of three different panel data analysis such as fixed effect, ran-
dom effect and maximum likelihood analysis. There are also shown lagged results of those 
models. The lagged method takes into account previous day’s effect on today’s stock prices 
when the recommendation has been changed. 
The second column of panel A represents the results of the fixed effect model and the third 
column shows the lagged results of the same model. As can be seen, the “Buy” portfolio’s 
coefficient (0,0003) is significant at 5% level and under the circumstances, buy recommen-
dations have a positive impact on stock returns. Then, when stock analysts give a buy rec-
ommendation for a particular company, its stock price should rise. Also, the fixed effect 
model provides s significant results at 5% level for the “Sell” portfolio. The “Sell” portfolio’s 
coefficient (-0,0002) is a negative one, hence sell recommendations have the opposite effect 
than the buy recommendations have. Thereby, when a stock analyst gives a sell recommen-
dation, then it should have a decreasing effect on stock prices. However, the fixed effect 
model could not give statistically significant results for the “Hold” portfolio. 
As mentioned above, the last column represents the lagged results of the fixed effect model. 
The lagged returns are highly significant at 1% level and its coefficient is negative. Thereby, 
the returns of the previous period have a decreasing effect all portfolio’s today’s returns. 
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However, in this scenario, buy recommendations have still a positive impact on stock returns 
while its coefficient (0,0003) is a positive one at 5% significance level. Also, it can be seen 
that sell recommendations have an even stronger decreasing effect (-0,0007) on returns and 
results are highly significant at 1% level. Past returns have also highly significant impact on 
the “Hold” portfolio’s today’s stock returns even though hold recommendation does not have 
any effect on returns. 
The second table of Panel B provides the results of the random effect model and the third 
column shows the results of the lagged random model. Recommendations have a positive 
effect on the “Buy” portfolio and the coefficient (0,0003) is a statistically significant at 5% 
level. Along these lines, the results are similar to the fixed effect model hence, when stock 
analysts give a buy recommendation, then stock prices should increase. The result of the 
“Sell” portfolio is a highly significant at 1% level and the coefficient (-0,0005) is negative. 
Thus, sell recommendations have a decreasing effect on stock prices. The random effect 
model did not find any statistically significant results of the “Hold” portfolio.  
The results of the lagged random effect model are presented in the last column in the panel 
B. Results have equal effect with the lagged fixed effect model, hence the past returns have 
a negative effect on the “Buy” portfolio’s today’s returns as well as past returns have a neg-
ative impact on the “Sell” portfolio’s and the “Hold” portfolio’s current returns. The results 
are highly significant at 1% level. However, the results show that there is a proof that buy 
recommendations have a positive impact on stock returns while the coefficient is positive 
(0,0003) and the effect is as strong as it is without lagged effect and results are statistically 
significant. Also, sell recommendations have even stronger decreasing effect on stock returns 
while the coefficient (-0,0006) is larger at high significance level. There is no statistical evi-
dence that hold recommendations have any effect on stock returns. 
The second column of panel C shows the results of the maximum likelihood and the third 
one represents the lagged results. The results are similar to the fixed effect model and the 
random effect model. The “Buy” portfolio’s coefficient (0,0003) is a statistically significant 
at 5% level and also a positive one, thus buy recommendations have an increasing effect on 
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stock prices. Thereby, stock prices should increase when stock analysts give a buy recom-
mendation. The “Sell” portfolio achieved statistically highly significant results at 1% level 
hence its coefficient (-0,0005) is negative and it has a decreasing effect on stock prices. As 
well as previous models, the maximum likelihood could not find any statistically significant 
results for the “Hold” portfolio. 
The last column of panel C presents the lagged results of the maximum likelihood method. 
As expected, the results are equivalent with the fixed effect model and the random effect 
model. Therefore, the past returns have a negative impact on all three portfolios and results 
are highly significant at 1% level. However, it is interesting to see, that buy recommenda-
tions’ have not anymore statistically significant impact on returns as it has before the lagged 
returns were taken into account. In contrast, sell recommendations have even more stronger 
and negative impact (-0,0006) on returns at 1% significance level. As before, the model could 
not find any statistically significant evidence for the hold recommendation’s impact on re-
turns. 
As a conclusion, all the models provides robust results that both, buy and sell recommenda-
tions have on impact on stock returns even though when lagged returns are taken into ac-
count. However, as expected, none of the models could not find any statistical results of hold 
recommendation’s impact on returns. Also, we can see that all the models’ results show that 
sell recommendations have stronger influence on stock returns than buy recommendations 
have. The influence of sell recommendations increased when lagged returns are taken into 
account while buy recommendation’s effect remained unchanged. This support assumption 
that sell recommendation is stronger factor than buy recommendation is.  
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Table 8. The results of the panel data analysis 
Panel regressions           
Panel A             
Portfolios   Simple Fixed Effects   Lagged Fixed Effects 
    Coefficient Robust Std. Err. Coefficient Robust Std. Err. 
       
Buy  0,0003** 0,0001  0,0003** 0,0002 
  (2,44)   (2,02)  
Returns     -0,0218*** 0,0066 
     (-3,33)  
       
Hold  -0,0001 0,0001  -1,20E-06 0,0001 
  (-0,81)   (0,01)  
Returns     -0,0218*** 0,0065 
     (-3,34)  
       
Sell  -0,0002** 0,0002  -0,0007*** 0,0002 
  (-2,19)   (-2,98)  
Returns     -0,0218*** 0,0066 
     (-3,34)  
Panel B             
    Simple Random Effects  Lagged Random Effects 
    Coefficient Robust Std. Err. Coefficient Robust Std. Err. 
       
Buy  0,0003** 0,0001  0,0003** 0,0001 
  (2,51)   (2,40)  
Returns     -0,0216*** 0,0066 
     (-3,29)  
       
Hold  -4,00E-05 0,0001  -9,00E-06 0,0001 
  (-0,38)   (0,09)  
Returns     -0,0216*** 0,0066 
     (-3,29)  
       
Sell  -0,0005*** 0,0002  -0,0006*** 0,0002 
  (-2,89)   (-3,92)  
Returns     -0,0216*** 0,0066 
          (-3,29)   
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Table 8. continued 
Panel C             
    MLE    Lagged MLE   
    Coefficient Bootstrap Std. Err. Coefficient Bootstrap Std. Err. 
       
Buy  0,0003** 0,0001  0,0003 0,0002 
  (2,51)   (1,43)  
Returns     -0,2160*** 0,0069 
     (-3,09)  
       
Hold  0,00004 0,0001  -9,00E-06 0,0001 
  (-0,43)   (0,07)  
Returns     -0,0215*** 0,0067 
     (-3,18)  
       
Sell  -0,0005*** 0,0002  -0,0006*** 0,0001 
  (-2,78)   (-4,57)  
Returns     -0,0216*** 0,0071 
          (-3,01)   
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level 
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level 
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level 
 
  
 
 
60 
 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate if there is a possibility to achieve posite abnormal 
returns by following analysts’ stock recommendations and whether recommendations have 
any affect stock prices and returns in Finnish stock market. According to the efficient market 
hypothesis, all available information should reflect prices immediately and achieving abnor-
mal returns should not be possible. 
Lin & McNichols (1998) investigate analysts’ recommendations independence and they 
found some evidence that there are some differences between recommendations strength 
done by independent or affiliated analysts. Also Stickel (1995) concluded that the strength 
of recommendation is depended on several different factors such as a reputation of analyst 
and size of brokerage-house. In addition, Womack’s (1996) research shows that sell recom-
mendation’s price-reaction is larger than buy recommendation have. Based on those earlier 
findings, it is necessary to understand the impact of recommendations thus individual inves-
tors, companies, institutions and banks are investing in the markets and their decision may 
have based on those recommendations which may not have completely independent. 
Previously, there was presented five different portfolios that were formed based on consensus 
recommendations and OMXH-PI was used as the market return and a 3-month Euribor as a 
risk-free rate. In addition, abnormal returns were calculated and alphas’ statistical signifi-
cance was tested by the OLS regression analysis. Using several panel data methods alongside 
the OLS regression, such as fixed effect model, random effect model and maximum likeli-
hood model, provide robustness check for the statistical analysis. Three main portfolios such 
as the “Buy”, the “Hold” and the “Sell” portfolios were tested by those panel data methods. 
The results of the OLS analysis indicates that stock recommendations have clear impact on 
stock prices and returns. In that case, the null hypothesis must be rejected thus it is possible 
to achieve positive abnormal returns by following recommendations, even though the hold 
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recommendation cannot provide that. The results of hold recommendations were insignifi-
cant and that may be due that analysts rather give a hold recommendation than buy or sell 
recommendation if they are uncertain about a performance of recommended company. That 
can be also noted from the amount of recommendations whereas around 54% of recommen-
dations were hold recommendations. 
The results are interesting thus as mentioned, by following strong buy recommendations it is 
possible to achieve positive abnormal returns. This may be due to the fact that stock analysts 
rarely give such an extreme recommendation as a strong buy and when they give that recom-
mendation, the market react rapidly because company’s valuation has been too low. It can be 
also noted that during the observation period, only 1,16% of given recommendations were 
strong buy thus individual companies’ performance is emphasized and their impact on port-
folio’s return is strong.  
Following buy recommendations investors may achieve positive abnormal returns and results 
are corresponding as strong buy recommendations’ impact is. The result seems to be logical 
thus analysts estimate that the recommended company is undervalued and their new recom-
mendation announcement should reflect to the prices and it have increasing effect on recom-
mended company’s value.  
However, it is surprising that strong sell recommendations generate positive abnormal returns 
because as default it should be the worst performing recommendation and investors should 
avoid investing in such kind of companies. When analysts give a strong sell recommendation, 
the company is estimated to be overvalued in analysts’ opinion. However, the great perfor-
mance of the “Strong Sell” portfolio may be due to that strong sell recommendations are a 
kind of extreme recommendations because only 1,59% of recommendations were strong sell 
during the observation period. Hence, as in the case of strong buy, the results may be due 
that individual companies have performed better and individual companies’ effect on stock 
prices and returns is greater than can be expected. 
In addition, the effect of recommendation was also tested by panel data methods and in that 
case, there were formed three portfolios, the “Buy”, the “Hold” and the “Sell” that were based 
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on consensus recommendations. Strong Buy and Strong Sell recommendations were added 
to the “Buy” and the “Sell” portfolios thus the results give a wider perspective when extreme 
recommendations are included into other portfolios. Portfolio’s impact on stock returns were 
tested by several different panel data methods such as a fixed effect model, a random effect 
model and a maximum likelihood model. In addition, the lagged returns were taken into ac-
count as well and it gives robustness for the analysis. 
It can be seen that stock recommendations have an impact on stock returns when focuses on 
buy or sell recommendations. Hence, buy recommendation should increase the recommended 
stock’s prices whereas sell recommendations have a decreasing effect on returns and prices 
and at last, hold recommendations do not have any significant impact on returns. Under these 
circumstances, hypothesis are being rejected even when lagged returns are taken into ac-
count. The results show that there are some differences between strength of impact on stock 
returns between buy and sell recommendations. The results of panel models show that sell 
recommendations have stronger impact on stock returns than buy recommendations have. 
That is important observation thus Womack (1996) found similar results. In that case, we can 
conclude that the strength of the sell recommendation is stronger than the buy recommenda-
tion has. The results may be due to it that stock analysts allow buy recommendations and sell 
recommendations only when they are confident about the direction where the recommended 
company is going. In that case, the analysts may give hold recommendations when they are 
uncertainty and it can be a kind of safe haven for analysts.  
All in all, after conservating and robustness tests, based on the results of the several panel 
data methods, the results are similar to the OLS regression results. Both methods, OLS and 
panel data, reject the null hypothesis and it can be said that stock recommendations have an 
impact on stock prices and returns, and by following recommendations it is possible to 
achieve positive abnormal returns even though the hold recommendations are not able to do 
that.  
Further research is needed to determine when the impact of recommendations start to affect 
prices and returns, and more specific, whether the impact is temporary or permanent. In that 
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case, it would be possible to determine if the impact is caused by price effect or information 
effect which would give more specific information about stock analysts’ abilities.  
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